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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
TE TAX COMMISSION 
UTAH, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
DEPARTMrNT OF FINANCE, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
14658 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is brought by the Utah State Tax 
Commission from an order of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues and denying the 
Tax Comrnission's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that this Court affirm the 
decision of the Third Judicial District Court and hold 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), as amended, to be 
unconstitutional. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1917, the Legislature created the State Insurance 
Fund. A comprehensive examination of the purposes and the 
nature of the Fund have been set out in Chez v. Industrial 
Commission, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936), and Gronni· 
v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977). Subsequently, the 
Legislature provided a 3 1/4 percent tax on the premiums 
paid by every insL ance company writi·g workmen's compensa-
tion or occupational disease disability insurance as follows: 
"Every insurance company 
engaged in the transaction of 
business in this state writing 
workmen's compensation or occupa-
tional disease disability insurance 
shall pay to the state tax commission, 
on or before the thirty-first day of 
March in each year, a tax of 3 1/4 % 
of the total premiums received by it 
during the next preceding calendar 
year from workmen's compensation or 
occupational disease disability 
insurance, subject to all provisions, 
limitations and exceptions contained in 
this section." Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(3) 
(1953), as amended. 
This section is not contested. 
In 1971, the Legislature levied a one percent tax 
on the premiumo, paid to the State Insurance Fund in addition 
to the 3 1/4 percent tax paid by the Fund and by private 
insurers. Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4 (l) (b) (1953), as 
amended, provides for: 
-2-
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. . a tax of 1% of the total 
premiums received bv it during the next 
preceding calendar year from insurance 
written within this state by any insurance 
fund or funds created bv chapter 100, Laws 
of Utah 1917, to be collected by the state 
tax commission and to cover into the state 
treasury to the credit of the state general 
fund. This tax shall be in addition to any 
and all taxes levied under this section." 
The Code does not levy this additional one percent 
premium tax against private insurance companies and, in the 
case of self-insured employers, provides for no premium tax 
or payment in lieu of tax. 
The Department of Finance, acting according to 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3 (1953), on behalf of the Fund, refused 
to pay the additional one percent tax. The Tax Commission 
then initiated this action to compel payment of the tax. 
Based upon defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Third District Court held Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-l(l) (b} 
(1953), unconstitutional and excused the Fund from payment 
of the extra one percent premium tax levied therein. 
Contesting that decision, the Tax Commission brings this 
appeal. 
-3-
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ARGUMI:NT 
POINT I 
THE TAX IMPOSED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), AS AMENDED, 
UNCONSTITuTIONALLY DEI'' eVES EMPLOYERS 
IN'·1.'RING \HTH 'L"IIE STAT;~ INSURANCE FUND 
OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAH AS DEFicJED 
BY ARTICLT:: I, SECT10N 2 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTIOU, AlJD THE FOURTEENTH N!END-
N.ENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
Appellant alleges that the tax imposed by Utah 
Coc\~ Ann. § 31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), is constitutionally 
acceptable. It argues that the difference in tax rates 
between the Fund and othPr private insurance carriers is 
due to additional servj · s and benefits provided the Ft1c1d 
by the State and its agencies. Citing authorities for the 
proposition that different classes may be taxed at different 
rates, appellant argues that the Fund is in a class separate 
from private insurance companies and, thus, subject to 
increased taxation. 
Respondent asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1) (b) 
(1953), and the tax levied exclusively on the State Insuranc · 
Fund therein are repugnant to all notions of equal protection 
of the law. Respondent strongly contends that, in substance, 
the State Insurance Fund is identical to private, mutual 
insurance carriers. Being of the same class, the Fun~ should 
-4-
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not be taxed at a rate in excess of that provided for 
private insurance companies. 
In light of this Court's recent decicion in 
Gronnin~; v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977), reaffirming 
Chez v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 
(1936), and its consideration of the origin, nature and 
purpose of the Fund in conjunection with Gronning, supra, 
respondent will just briefly set forth the major features 
of the Fund and its function. The assets of the Fund 
belong to contributing employers who pool money in a 
State created "mutual insurance co~rany" to provide the 
means for meeting the employer's obligation to pay awards 
to workmen killed or injured on the job or as a result of 
an occupational disease. Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d at 
692. 
In addition to the State Insurance Fund, an 
employer may meet his workmen's compensation insurance duty 
in two other ways: (l) by insuring with a private insurance 
company writing workmen's compensation and occupational 
disease insurance, or (2) through self-insurance. The 
Legislature has •. dxed premiums on each type of insurance 
as follows: 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1) Self-insurance. There is no premium and 
hence no tax. 
(2) Private insurance underwriter. Premiums 
are taxed at 3 1/4 percent. 
(3) State Insurance Fund. Premiums are taxed 
at 3 1/4 percent, as are the premiums of other private 
insurers, and at an additional one percent. 
Respondent recognizes that the Legislature is 
endowed with discretion and pmver to make classifications 
for the purposes of taxation but such discretion is not 
without constitutional limits. The Legislature may establish 
different classes and provide separate and individual rates 
for each class, but it is always bound by the principles of 
equality and uniformity. Big l'7ood Canal Co. v. Unempl_oyment 
Compensation Division, 126 P.2d 15, 63 Idaho 785 (1942). 
Therefore, upon judicial review, the Supreme Court will not 
concern itself with the policy or wisdom of legislative 
classifications, but functions to determine whether such 
classifications operate equally on all persons similarly 
situated. Slater v. Salt Lake City, 206 P.2d 153, 115 
Utah 476 (1949). 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution as being abridged when an unreasonable 
discrimation exists "between those included and those 
-6-
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excluded from an act whether the act confers a privilege 
or a right or imposes a duty or an obligation." State v. 
1-lason, 78 P.2d 920, 94 Utah SOl (1938), 78 P.2d at 922. 
Discri10ination results when a law is inclusive as to some 
class or group and as to serve human relationships, 
transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the remainder. 
For that reason, for a classification to be unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, it must be arbitrary and unreasonable. 
State v. Hasen, supra; Hanson v. Public Employees Retirement 
System, 246 P.2d 591, 122 Utah 44 (1952). This Court has 
adjudged a law to be arbitrary and unreasonable where some 
persons or transactions included in the operation of the law 
are, as to subject matter, in no differentiable class from 
those excluded from its operation, and if no reasonable 
basis to differentiate those excluded from those included 
in its operation can be found, it must be held unconstitutional. 
State v. Nason, supra; Big Wood Canal Co., supra; Carter v. 
State Tax Commission, 96 P.2d 727, 98 Utah 96 (1939). The 
Carter Court stated: 
"It is equally well settled 
that a statute makes an improper 
and unlawful discrimination if it 
confers particular privileges upon 
a class arbitrarily selected from a 
larger number of persons, all of 
whom stand in the same relation to 
the privileges granted, and 
-7-
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betwe~n whom and tl person not so 
favou_j no reasoi• 'Jle distinction or 
subo;tantial diff(· ,,nee can be found 
jusLifying the in~lusion of one and 
the exclusion of the other." 96 
P.2d at 732. 
The courts have found a violatlon of the equal 
protection standard in several cases g• rally analoguus 
to the instant case. In Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 
(1933), the United States Supreme Court examined a Florida 
statute taxing chain stores. The statute provided a set 
tax for each store of the same chain within the same 
county. Hu..;ever, \-Then a new store was opened in a different 
county, a higher ~ax was imposed upon the new store and upon 
all other stores within the original county. The Supreme 
Court found this statute arbitrary, and void, determining 
that the county line furnishes no rational basis for such a 
classification. 
In State v. North American Car Corp., 164 P.2d 
161, 118 Mont. 182 (1945), the Supreme Court of Montana 
considered a grolp of statutory provisions taxing railroad 
frei<Jht cars. Freight cars owned by common-carrier railroads 
not operating within ';ontana but which were furnished by such 
carriers, for compensation, to con®on carrier railroads 
operating within the State were taxed at a higher rate 
than freight cars owned by corr~on-carrier railroads operating 
within Montana. The cars were of similar nature, kind, 
-8-
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utilization and 'assifica~ion. The Montana Court found 
such a class to be arbitrary and constitutionally 
discriminatory, stating: 
. any tax against the same 
kind of property used for idential 
purposes is not uniform when a different 
valuation and a different rate is applied 
to two distinct taxpayers, separately 
distinguish2ble only in name, and the 
tax being imposed by the same taxing 
district." 164 P.2d at 166. 
Finally, in Perm Phillips ~ands v. State Tax 
Commission, 430 P.2d 349, 247 Ore. 380 (1967), the Oregon 
Supreme Court considered a case whe~e the taxpayer's real 
estate was reappraised at a rate of $60.00 per acre while 
neighboring lands appraised at not ~ore than $5.00 per acre. 
The taxpayer's land was indistinguishable from that of his 
neighbors', the court noting only that the taxpayer designated 
his land as "homesites" and had invested considerable amounts 
of sales promotion. The Oreg·· Court found the higher rate 
applied to taxpayer to be unconstitutionally discriminatory as 
taxpayer's "class" was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has 
be· ' singled out from among a larger class of insurers to 
pay a tax imposed upon no one else. Respondent asserts that 
this tax is arbitrary and constitutionally prohibite •. 
The State Insurance Fund is just one of a larger 
class of workmen's compensation and occupational disease 
insurance writers. The assets of the Fund exist only to 
-9-
private insu~ cover the identical obligations covered by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Fund has the same administrative costs as private insurers: 
establishment of premium and hazard rates, procedures for 
analyzin~ claims and making disbursements, reinsurance 
considerations, Fund investment decisions, collection 
procedure~ legal fees and policy issuance. These administrative 
costs, as well as many other administration related expenses, 
are deducted from the Fund by the Legislature's appropriations 
of Fund money in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-1 (1953), 
as amended. The Fund has the same rights to sue and be sued 
and makes contracts that a private i~surer has. The Fund 
enjoys no immunities not provided for the private insurer. 
In essence, the State Insurance Fund is indistinguishable 
from private insurance writers, the only difference being 
its administration by a State agency. 
Appellant contends that the Fund is a separate and 
valid class for tax purposes being one of "any insurance 
fundorfunds created by Chapter 100, La\vs of Utah, 1917." 
This "class" is fictitious as there is only one fund (the 
State Insurance Fund), created by Chapter 100, Laws of Utah 
1917, such being the case.for sixty years. 
As this Court determined in Chez v. Industrial 
Commission, supra and Gronning v. Smart, supra, the Fund 
is a mutual insurance company and properly belongs to the 
class designated by Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(3) (1953). 
-10-
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Appcllflnt's argument infccs that the additional tax 
could be justified on a de minimus theory. Ap• llant argues 
that respondent's operating costs are lower than those of 
private insurers and, therefore, it is only fair to tax 
it at a higher rate in order to equaliz0 their relative 
financial positions. The record does not support this con-
tention and respondent's supposed ability to pay does not 
establish sufficient differentiation to justify a separate 
class for taxation purposes. As the California Supreme 
Court stated in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 
388 P.2c 720, 60 C.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, vacatec 
380 U.S. 194, on remand 400 P.2d 321, 60 C.2d 58G, t3 Cal. 
Rptr. 329 (1964): 
. the mere presence 
of wealth or lack thereof . 
cannot be the basis for valid 
class discrimination." 388 P.2d 
at 723. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that there are no 
natural, intrinsic or fundamental differences between the 
Fund and private insurance writers. To provide an additional 
tax exclusively for the Fund without clearly establishing the 
necessary differences is arbitrary and unreasonable, and 
respondent asserts, a violation of equal protection of the law. 
Respondent makes one additional point. Self-insurers pay 
no prewium tax. Failure to secure an equivalent tax from self-
insurers denies employers insuring with the Fund and private 
insurance companies equal protection of the law. The law favors 
-ll-
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sufficienl assets t:c' be self-insur<'cl. 
of Utah Code Ann. § 31-14- · (1953), may he C'V<"'n ITtOrc rlcnJbtful. 
POil li 
UTAH CODE Arm. §31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953) 
AS N1ENDED, IS A SPECIAL Ll\\·1 AND IS 
THEREFORE U~CO~STITUTIO~AL. 
Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Cons lei tution 
presently provides that, "No private or special law shall 
be enacted where a general law can be applicable." This 
1972 Amendment replaced the former section which enum·:crated 
spec:ific cases in \·lhich the Legislature was prohibited from 
enacting private or special law, and also provided that in 
"all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special 
lav; shall be enacted." 
In State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 97 Utah 492 (1939), 
this Court set fortL definitions of special and general laws 
as follov1s: 
"Laws which apply to and operate 
uniforQly upon all members of any class 
of persons, places, or things requiring 
legislation peculiar to themselves in the 
matters covered by the laws in question, 
are general and not special. . Special 
legislation is such as relates either to 
particular persons, places, or things, or 
to persons, places, or things which, though 
not particularized, are separated by any 
method of selection from the whole class 
to which the law might, but for such legis-
lation, be applied, " 94 P.2d at 421. 
Article VI, Section 26 was designed and enact~>d to 
prevent the Legislature from singling out special interest 
groups for special treatwent; treatment either favorable or 
-12-
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unfQVOr~bln. Special laws are therefore prohibited in any 
c~se where a general law is applicable. It is also clear 
that legislation which violates the prohibition against 
special or private laws may also run afoul with the equal 
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 
l1n example of an improper special law is set forth 
in Continental Insurance Co. v. Srnrha , 270 N.W. 122, 131 
lJeb. 791 (1936). The llebraska Supren:e Court held a 2% tax 
on premiums received on fire insurance to be distributed 
to cities and villages to maintain ~ire departments to be 
invalid stating: 
"It necessarily follo~s that the law 
is not general but special w~ich does not 
operate uniformly upo~ the class within the 
relations or circumstances provided for." 
2 7 0 ll • 1'1. at 12 4 . 
Respondent contends that Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4 
(1) (b) (l9S3), as amended, is a special law in violation of 
Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution. The State 
Insurance Fund is engaged solely in the business of writing 
workmen's compensation and occupational disease disability 
insurance. As such, it i~ part of a larger class of work-
men's compensation insurers. The Fund is indistinguishable 
from the larger class of private insurers in terms of its 
intrinsic purpose and operation. It is distinguishable 
-13-
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perhaps only by the fuct that it is State administered. 
'rherefore, lx"ing just one of many "mutual insurance cc.,n-
panies", the Fund clearly should be tn.xed under the general 
law applicable to all workmen's compensation insurer~; Utah 
Code Ann. §31-14-4(3). But the Fund is also taxed an 
additional 1~ under Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4(1) (b). Sub-
section (1) (b), creat0d to tax". any insurance fund 
or funds created by Chapter 100, Laws of Utah, 1917," can 
only be applied to the State Insurance Fund. Thus, Utah 
Code Ann, §31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), as a.;-::ended, is a special 
law in that it operates exclusivel~ u~on one insurer, 
indistinguishable from the entire class, to which the 
general law would, but for such law, te applied. Such a law 
clearly violates ~rticle VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and is therefore void. 
-14-
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POIN'l' III 
REPSO!WF:i-:T' S flOTIOtl FOE SUi'ii11\FY JUDG:IJ:::IJT 
\VAS PROJ' L:Rl.Y GPJ1U'i'L:D Ill ';'!If; TIUAL COUR'L'. 
Appellant contends that the trial .:ourt erred 
in its grani:ing of ccefendant 's ilotion for Summary Jucgment 
because genuine issu~s of fact existed which needed to 
be revolved before a sur;unary judgment could be granted in 
favor of the Departr~nt of Finance. 
A Motion for Surrunary Judgment is properly granted 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the movi~g party is entitled to such a judgment as a matter 
of lavl. :!orris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297, 123 Utah 
289 (1953). ResponC::ent asserts thu_t its 1-'loticr. £or Su:-nrnary 
Judgment ~as properly granted as there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact. 
This Court is thoroughly familiar with the laws 
relating to the Stat~ Insurance Fund having recently examined 
extensive briefs and heard considerable argument from the 
Fund, the Industrial Conmission and from various employc:rs 
who filed briefs as 'micus curiae in Gronning v. Smart, 
supra. The: essential quc;stion presented in the instant 
case is whether the Legislature can impose a 1% premium 
tax only upon the State Insurance Fund. 'i'his is a qu' -:tion 
of law v1llich was properly resolved in a summary proceeding 
in the trial court. 
-15-
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Appellant :':0'.1 attc:n]': ·; to i.H"CJUC thctl. <Jenui.nc 
factuo.l questions e:·:ist and t:l1ul it could sho• .. · fucto; under 
which it would be entitled to judgment. Rc,.;pon<lent notc;s 
that pluintiff motioned the tri<tl court for summary jud<JW~nt 
in its favor at the same ti~e defendant did. Appcllunt. 
cannot now, on appeal, object to the relief granted defend .. , 
in the trial court Khen it sought the exact same type of 
relief through an identical motion. By motioning the trial 
court for sur:u'Uary juC:gment, plaintiff asserted that no 
material factual questions existed. Obviously, if there 
were no s~bstantial issues of fact then, there are none now. 
This court has consistently prohibited litigants 
from raising objections on appeal which were not raised in 
the trial court. To entertain appellant's argument concern-
ing the propriety of summary jud<jment I'IOuld run directly 
contrary to this notion, considering the fact that summary 
judgment was the same motion it sought in the trial court. 
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COHCLUS lOll 
In Gror>'_'ng v. Smart, supra, the Supreme Court 
held that a legislative appropriation of State Insurance 
Fund assets for the payment of obligations incurred by the 
State in the discharge of its police power denied the Fund 
and its members due process of law. In Gronning, the Court 
found it unnecessary to consiccr the issue of equal protection, 
but this case squarely puts that issue. In addition, this 
case raises the issue of the co:-tstitutionality of a special 
law. 
In Gronnin9, this Court refused to penni t a 
legislative ''raid" of Fund assets for non-insurance purposes. 
Through the artful use of language, the Legislature now seeks 
to put the Fund into a separate classification in order to 
grasp part of its premiums, thus imposin9 a tax penalty upon 
these employers Hho choose or 1·1ho are compelled to insure with 
the Fund. Respondent argues that the Fund cannot constitu-
tionally be placed in a class separate from other "mutual 
insurance companies" in that no intrinsic differences separate 
it therefrom. To allow such a fictitious classification 
is arbitrary and a denial of equal protection on the law. 
Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4 (3) (1953) taxes all workmen • s 
compensation insurers at a uniform rate, yet subsection (1) (b) 
-17- .. 
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provides an additional tax applicable only to a single 
i•,3urcr, the State Insurance Fund. Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4 
(l)(b)(l''>3), as amcnucc1, is a special or private la11 and 
is prohibited by Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Consti-
tution. 
This Court should protect the Fund from unconsti-
tional levies as it has heretofore protected the Fund from 
unlawful confiscation and depletion. 
Respect~ully submitted, 
JOSEPH P. HcCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Ca0itol 
Salt Lake ciiy, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
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